Comprehensive Security Audit Report - Wildbox Security Platform

Executive Summary

This security audit identified 19 security issues across the Wildbox Security Platform codebase, ranging from Critical to Low severity. The platform has implemented several good security practices (bcrypt password hashing, defusedxml for XXE protection, proper JWT implementation) but has notable vulnerabilities in authentication, CORS configuration, code injection risks, and hardcoded credentials in committed files.

CRITICAL ISSUES

1. Code Injection via eval() - Python Deserialization

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-agents/app/main.py (Line 266) Severity: CRITICAL Risk: Remote Code Execution (RCE)

task_metadata = eval(task_metadata_str.decode())

Issue: Using eval() to deserialize untrusted data from Redis can allow arbitrary code execution if an attacker can control the Redis data.

Fix:

Replace with json.loads() for safe JSON deserialization
Use json.dumps() when storing instead of str(task_metadata)

task_metadata = json.loads(task_metadata_str.decode())

2. Hardcoded Credentials in Committed .env File

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-identity/.env Severity: CRITICAL Risk: Credential Exposure, Unauthorized Access

Issues Found:

Line 2: DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:password@localhost:5432/identity_db (plaintext password)
Line 5: JWT_SECRET_KEY=INSECURE-DEFAULT-JWT-SECRET-CHANGE-THIS (default/insecure key)
Line 10-12: Stripe test keys (even test keys should not be in repo)

Fix:

Remove all .env files from git history: git filter-branch --tree-filter 'rm -f open-security-identity/.env' HEAD
Ensure .env is in .gitignore (already done for root)
Add to open-security-identity/.gitignore: .env and .env.* except .env.example
Use environment variable injection in deployment

3. Missing Authentication on Critical API Endpoints

Files:

/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-agents/app/main.py (Line 180)
/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-responder/app/main.py (Line 133)

Severity: CRITICAL Risk: Unauthorized Access to Core Functionality

Issue: Public endpoints that execute critical operations without authentication:

@app.post("/v1/analyze", ...)
async def analyze_ioc(request: AnalysisTaskRequest):  # NO AUTH CHECK
    """Submit IOC for analysis"""

@app.post("/v1/playbooks/{playbook_id}/execute")
async def execute_playbook(playbook_id: str, ...):  # NO AUTH CHECK
    """Execute a playbook"""

Fix: Add authentication dependencies:

from fastapi import Depends
from app.auth import get_current_user

@app.post("/v1/analyze", ...)
async def analyze_ioc(
    request: AnalysisTaskRequest,
    current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user)
):

HIGH SEVERITY ISSUES

4. Overly Permissive CORS Configuration (Wildcard Origins)

Files:

/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-agents/app/main.py (Line 91)
/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-responder/app/main.py (Line 79)
/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-data/app/config.py (Line 64)

Severity: HIGH Risk: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), Data Exfiltration

Issue:

CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=["*"],  # Dangerous!
allow_credentials=True,  # Even more dangerous with wildcard

Fix: Restrict to specific domains:

allow_origins=[
    os.getenv("CORS_ORIGINS", "http://localhost:3000").split(",")
],
allow_credentials=True,

For data service - explicitly enumerate:

cors_origins: List[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: [
    "https://dashboard.wildbox.com",
    "https://app.wildbox.com"
])

5. SQL Injection Risk in osquery Table Validation

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-sensor/sensor/collectors/osquery_manager.py (Line 411) Severity: HIGH Risk: SQL Injection via Dynamic Table Names

table_pattern = r'(?:FROM|JOIN)\s+(\w+)'
tables = re.findall(table_pattern, query, re.IGNORECASE)

for table in tables:
    test_query = f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} LIMIT 1;"  # VULNERABLE
    result = subprocess.run(['osqueryi', '--json', test_query], ...)

Issue: While regex restricts to \w+, it’s still unsafe. Even though subprocess is not using shell=True, this is fragile.

Fix: Use osquery’s native validation APIs instead:

# Use osquery's schema API instead of dynamic query construction
# Or use parameterized queries if available

6. Missing Rate Limiting on Public Endpoints

Files:

/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-agents/app/main.py
/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-responder/app/main.py

Severity: HIGH Risk: Denial of Service (DoS), Resource Exhaustion

Issue: Public endpoints like /v1/analyze and /v1/playbooks/{id}/execute can be called unlimited times, consuming resources.

Fix: Implement rate limiting:

from slowapi import Limiter
from slowapi.util import get_remote_address

limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)

@app.post("/v1/analyze")
@limiter.limit("10/minute")  # 10 requests per minute per IP
async def analyze_ioc(request: Request, ...):

7. Plaintext Logging of Sensitive Data

Files:

/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-identity/demo.py (Line 22)
/Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-identity/auth.py (Line 291)

Severity: HIGH Risk: Information Disclosure, Credentials in Logs

# demo.py line 22
print(f"Password: {password}")  # Logs plaintext password

# auth.py line 291
print(f"Authentication error: {str(e)}")  # May include sensitive info

Fix: Remove password logging and mask sensitive data:

# DON'T log passwords ever
logger.debug("Authentication attempt")  # OK

# Mask errors
except Exception as e:
    logger.error("Authentication error occurred", exc_info=False)

8. Insecure Default Secrets in docker-compose.yml

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/docker-compose.yml (Lines 28-36) Severity: HIGH Risk: Data Compromise, Unauthorized Access

- DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:postgres@postgres:5432/identity}
- JWT_SECRET_KEY=${JWT_SECRET_KEY:-please-set-jwt-secret-in-env-file}
- STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=${STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET:-whsec_set_your_webhook_secret}
- INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-CHANGE-THIS-PASSWORD}
- API_KEY=${API_KEY:-wbx-<REDACTED-LEAKED-KEY>}

Fix: Remove all default values. Use only ${VAR_NAME} which will fail if not set:

- DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL}  # Will fail if not set - this is good!
- JWT_SECRET_KEY=${JWT_SECRET_KEY}
- INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD}

Also, change line 58 API_KEY - this looks like a real key was exposed:

- API_KEY=${API_KEY:-wbx-<REDACTED-LEAKED-KEY>}  # EXPOSED KEY!

Immediate Action: If wbx-<REDACTED-LEAKED-KEY> is a real key, rotate it immediately.

MEDIUM SEVERITY ISSUES

9. Missing Input Validation on Unprotected Endpoints

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-agents/app/main.py (Line 181) Severity: MEDIUM Risk: Injection Attacks, Unexpected Behavior

async def analyze_ioc(request: AnalysisTaskRequest):
    # No validation of IOC type/value for malicious patterns
    task_metadata = {
        "ioc": request.ioc.dict(),  # May contain malicious data
    }

Fix: Add robust input validation:

from pydantic import validator, Field

class AnalysisTaskRequest(BaseModel):
    ioc: IOC
    priority: str = Field(..., regex="^(low|medium|high|critical)$")
    
class IOC(BaseModel):
    type: str = Field(..., regex="^(ip|domain|hash|url)$")
    value: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=2048)
    
    @validator('value')
    def validate_ioc_value(cls, v, values):
        ioc_type = values.get('type')
        # Validate based on type
        ...

10. Weak Hashing Algorithms Supported (md5, sha1)

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-tools/app/tools/hash_generator/main.py (Lines 28-65) Severity: MEDIUM Risk: Weak Cryptography, Compliance Issues

ALGORITHMS = {
    'md5': hashlib.md5,      # BROKEN
    'sha1': hashlib.sha1,    # DEPRECATED
    ...
}

DEPRECATED = ['md5', 'sha1']

Issue: While these are marked as deprecated, they’re still available. MD5 and SHA1 have known collision attacks.

Fix: Remove or move to a “legacy only” mode:

ALGORITHMS = {
    'sha256': hashlib.sha256,
    'sha512': hashlib.sha512,
    'blake2b': hashlib.blake2b,
}

LEGACY_ALGORITHMS = {  # Only for compatibility
    'md5': hashlib.md5,
    'sha1': hashlib.sha1,
}

11. Missing CSRF Protection Validation

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-identity/app/config.py (Line 40) Severity: MEDIUM Risk: Cross-Site Request Forgery

Issue:

cors_allow_headers: list[str] = ["*"]  # Allows any headers - CSRF not checked

Fix: Be explicit about allowed headers:

cors_allow_headers: list[str] = [
    "Content-Type",
    "Authorization",
    "X-CSRF-Token",
]
cors_expose_headers: list[str] = [
    "X-CSRF-Token",
]

Also add CSRF middleware for state-changing operations.

12. Missing Security Headers

Severity: MEDIUM Risk: Clickjacking, XSS, MIME Type Sniffing

Issue: No explicit security headers configured in FastAPI applications.

Fix: Add middleware for security headers:

from fastapi.middleware import Middleware
from fastapi import FastAPI

@app.middleware("http")
async def add_security_headers(request, call_next):
    response = await call_next(request)
    response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
    response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY"
    response.headers["X-XSS-Protection"] = "1; mode=block"
    response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
    response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'"
    return response

13. Subprocess Usage Without Input Validation

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-sensor/sensor/collectors/log_forwarder.py (Line 281) Severity: MEDIUM Risk: Command Injection

result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)

Issue: While subprocess.run without shell=True is safer, the cmd source should be validated.

Fix: Use list form with explicit parameters:

result = subprocess.run(
    ['/usr/bin/journalctl', '-n', '100', '--output', 'json'],  # Explicit args
    capture_output=True,
    text=True,
    timeout=30,
    cwd=None,  # Explicitly set
)

14. Insecure Deserialization - json.loads() without validation

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-cspm/app/main.py (Multiple lines) Severity: MEDIUM Risk: Injection Attacks, Unexpected Type Confusion

metadata = json.loads(metadata_json)  # Assumes valid JSON from Redis

Issue: No validation of JSON schema before processing.

Fix: Use Pydantic models for validation:

from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError

class TaskMetadata(BaseModel):
    task_id: str
    status: str
    ...

try:
    metadata = TaskMetadata(**json.loads(metadata_json))
except ValidationError as e:
    logger.error(f"Invalid metadata: {e}")
    raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid metadata format")

15. Default Django Secret Key (Guardian)

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-guardian/guardian/settings.py (Line 23) Severity: MEDIUM Risk: Session Hijacking, CSRF Token Forgery

SECRET_KEY = os.getenv('SECRET_KEY', 'your-secret-key-here-change-in-production')

Fix: Require environment variable:

SECRET_KEY = os.getenv('SECRET_KEY')
if not SECRET_KEY:
    raise ValueError("SECRET_KEY environment variable must be set")

# Validate it's not a default value
if SECRET_KEY in ['your-secret-key-here-change-in-production', 'change-me']:
    raise ValueError("SECRET_KEY must be changed from default")

LOW SEVERITY ISSUES

16. Missing API Key Validation on Tools Endpoint

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/open-security-tools/app/api/router.py (Line 22) Severity: LOW Risk: Information Disclosure

Issue: API key required but endpoints don’t return 401 uniformly:

async def list_tools(request: Request, api_key: str = Depends(verify_api_key)):
    # verify_api_key might raise HTTPException

Fix: Ensure consistent error responses and validate thoroughly.

17. Debug Flag in Production

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/docker-compose.yml (Line 59) Severity: LOW (if DEBUG is false in production) Risk: Information Disclosure

- DEBUG=${DEBUG:-false}

Fix: Add validation to ensure DEBUG is false:

if os.getenv('ENVIRONMENT') == 'production' and os.getenv('DEBUG') == 'true':
    raise ValueError("DEBUG cannot be true in production")

18. Weak Password Requirements in Demo

File: /Users/fab/GitHub/wildbox/tests/verify_authentication_complete.py (Line 581) Severity: LOW Risk: Weak Authentication

password = "demopassword123"  # Simple password

Fix: Use stronger test passwords:

password = "TempDemo@2024!SecurePass"  # Meets complexity requirements

19. Missing API Documentation Security

Severity: LOW Risk: Information Disclosure

Issue: Swagger/OpenAPI docs exposed at /docs without authentication.

Fix: Disable in production or protect:

# Only enable in development
if not settings.debug:
    docs_url = None
    redoc_url = None

app = FastAPI(
    title="...",
    docs_url=docs_url,
    redoc_url=redoc_url,
)

SUMMARY TABLE

Severity	Count	Issues
CRITICAL	3	Code injection (eval), Hardcoded credentials, Missing authentication
HIGH	6	Permissive CORS, SQL injection risk, No rate limiting, Plaintext logging, Default secrets, Guardian defaults
MEDIUM	8	Input validation, Weak hashes, No CSRF protection, Missing headers, Subprocess risks, Insecure deserialization, Django secret, API validation
LOW	2	Debug flag, Weak test passwords, API doc security

Total Issues: 19

REMEDIATION PRIORITY

Immediate (Within 24 hours):
- Fix code injection (eval) vulnerability - CRITICAL RCE risk
- Remove hardcoded credentials from .env file in git
- Add authentication to critical endpoints
- Validate API key wbx-<REDACTED-LEAKED-KEY> hasn’t been exposed
Short-term (Within 1 week):
- Fix CORS configuration
- Implement rate limiting
- Add security headers middleware
- Fix logging of sensitive data
- Remove default secrets from docker-compose
Medium-term (Within 2 weeks):
- Input validation enhancements
- Remove weak hash algorithms
- Add CSRF protection
- Secure Guardian SECRET_KEY requirement
- Subprocess input validation
Ongoing:
- Security headers validation
- API documentation security
- Dependency vulnerability scanning
- Regular security audits

RECOMMENDATIONS

Implement Security Testing in CI/CD:
- Add bandit for Python security checks
- Add safety for dependency vulnerability scanning
- Add trivy or snyk for container scanning
Enable Secret Scanning:
- Use git-secrets or detect-secrets pre-commit hooks
- Enable GitHub secret scanning
Add Security Middleware Stack:
- Request/Response validation
- Rate limiting
- Security headers
- CORS validation
Authentication/Authorization:
- Implement authz on all sensitive endpoints
- Use role-based access control (RBAC)
- Implement API key rotation policies
Logging & Monitoring:
- Implement structured logging
- Never log passwords, tokens, or credentials
- Monitor for suspicious activity
- Set up security event alerts

COMPLIANCE NOTES

Current implementation is partially aligned with:

OWASP Top 10 (some issues present)
CWE/SANS Top 25 (several CWEs identified)
Missing: GDPR data protection logging, PII handling

Audit Date: November 7, 2024 Audit Scope: Python FastAPI/Django services, Docker configuration, dependency files Tools Used: Manual code review, grep/pattern matching, dependency analysis